e.V. · 1. Bundesliga · Est. 1966 · Stadion An der Alten Försterei (22.012) · Berlin
What is the financial situation of 1. FC Union Berlin? 1. FC Union Berlin achieves a Financial Stability Score of 28 out of 100 (rating: red). The equity ratio stands at 2.1% (league average: 34.1%), the personnel cost ratio at 47.7%. The liabilities ratio is 79.3%. Equity stands at €2.9M.
Data as of:DFL Financials: FY 2023/24 (reporting date 30.06.2024)·Squad values: April 2026·Transfers: current·Update: DFL FY 24/25 expected May/June 2026
From cult club to CL participant to crisis — in record time. Union Berlin's meteoric rise (2019: promotion, 2023: CL qualification) was followed by an equally rapid sporting decline. The CL season exposed the club to costs it couldn't sustain. The Alte Försterei (22,012) is too small for the new ambitions, but expansion is slow. A Minsky case study in real time.
Union ist der Club der am meisten vom CL-Minsky-Moment betroffen ist: Hat sich für eine CL-Saison übernommen, sportlich gescheitert, und sitzt jetzt auf der fragilsten Bilanz der Liga. Die Fan-Identität und der Stadionausbau sind die Hoffnung — aber die Zahlen sind brutal.
Financial data shown is based on DFL Financial Indicators 2025 (FY 2023/24, reporting date 30.06.2024). The Bundesliga overall grew by 6.7% in 2024/25 to over €5 billion in revenue. Whether 1. FC Union Berlin benefited disproportionately will be revealed by the next DFL Financial Indicators, expected May or June 2026. The Outlook tab below contains an informed projection.
28
Fragile
Revenue 2023-24
€178M
Gross revenue · Konzern accounts
Personnel Cost Ratio
47.7%
League avg. 47.9%
Squad Value
€0M
BV €0M · Reserves €0M
Stadion An der Alten Försterei
22.012 seats
Eigentum
Equity Ratio
2.1%
League avg. 34.1%
Liabilities Ratio
79.3%
League avg. 47.0%
Summary: From cult club to CL participant to crisis — in record time. Union Berlin's meteoric rise (2019: promotion, 2023: CL qualification) was followed by an equally rapid sporting decline. The CL season exposed the club to costs it couldn't sustain. The Alte Försterei (22,012) is too small for the new ambitions, but expansion is slow. A Minsky case study in real time.
DFL License Check
Equity now positive after years of negative territory. But the buffer is thin. One bad season could push Union back below zero.
Positive Equity
\u2713
€2.9M
Passed
Equity Ratio > 30%
\u2717
2.1%
-27.9pp below threshold
Liabilities < 50%
\u2717
79.3%
-29.3pp above limit
Balance Sheet (2024-06-30)
Total Assets€139.1M
Equity€2.9M
Liabilities€110.3M
P&L (2023-24)
Revenue€178M
Personnel Costs€85M
EBITDA€29.8M
Net Income€1.2M
Equity X-Ray — Hidden Reserves
CL-driven transfers inflated the squad cost base. Several players were acquired at premiums that now exceed market values. Union need to reduce the wage bill.
Squad Valuation
Player Assets (Book Value)€0M
Squad Market Value€0M
Hidden Reserves€0M
Key Players (largest hidden reserves)
Transfer Balance (5 Years)
Season
Spending
Income
Net
2025-26
€20M
€15M
-€5M
2024-25
€25M
€20M
-€5M
2023-24
€55M
€15M
-€40M
2022-23
€30M
€10M
-€20M
2021-22
€15M
€10M
-€5M
5-Year Balance
€145M
€70M
-€75M
Financial Stability Score — Components
Equity Ratio (25%)
5
Personnel Costs (25%)
70
Liabilities (20%)
5
Transfer Balance (15%)
25
Revenue Diversif. (15%)
45
Strengths
Passionate fan base — unique culture
Stadium owned (Alte Försterei)
Stadium expansion underway
Strong community identity
Weaknesses
Stadium too small (22,012) for current ambitions
CL spending overstretched the budget
Equity barely positive
Sporting decline after CL high point
Risk Profile
Leading Indicators
EK nahe Null
2,9 Mio EK. Ein Verlust von 3 Mio macht EK negativ → DFL-Aufsicht verschärft sich.
Stadionausbau-Kosten
Ausbau Alte Försterei auf 37.000 Plätze — langfristig richtig, kurzfristig erhöht es die Verbindlichkeiten.
Structural Risks
Sehr hoch
EK nahe Null bei gleichzeitig höchster VQ
2,1% EK-Quote + 79,3% VQ = eine der fragilsten Bilanzen der BL-Geschichte. Vergleichbar mit Schalke 2019.
Hoch
CL-Kater
55 Mio Transferausgaben 2023-24 ohne sportlichen Return. Spieler verlieren an Wert, Buchwerte bleiben.
Black Swan
Abstieg bei negativem EK
Wenn Union absteigt und gleichzeitig EK ins Negative dreht (nur 2,9 Mio Puffer), droht das Schalke-Szenario: Abstieg + negative EK = Lizenzentzug-Risiko, Notverkäufe, Spirale.
Stadionausbau-Kosten eskalieren
Baukosten steigen, Finanzierung wird teurer, VQ steigt über 85%. Bei gleichzeitigem sportlichen Misserfolg: Doppelbelastung.
Outlook — FY 2024/25 Projection
Estimate · No official figures
Official DFL financial data covers FY 2023/24. Based on known parameters — transfer activity 2024/25, league growth (+6.7% per DFL Economic Report), sporting results — an informed projection for 30.06.2025 can be constructed. This estimate will be replaced once the official DFL financial data is published, expected May/June 2026.
Metric
FY 23/24 (DFL)
FY 24/25 (Estimate)
Revenue
€178M
~€190M
Personnel Costs
€85M
~€90M
Personnel Cost Ratio
47.7%
~47.4%
Estimated Result
€1.2M
~€1–1M
Estimated Equity
€2.9M
~€4–4M
Estimated Equity Ratio
2.1%
~3–3%
Simulator (coming soon): Scenario Simulator (coming soon): From summer 2026, you can run scenarios here — What happens upon relegation? What does Europa League qualification bring? Revenue, costs, required actions — interactive per club.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is Union in financial trouble?
Not existentially, but stressed. The CL season inflated costs beyond what the club's revenue base can sustain. Equity is barely positive, the wage bill needs reduction.
Why is the Alte Försterei a problem?
22,012 capacity is the smallest in the Bundesliga. It limits matchday revenue and commercial potential. The planned expansion is critical but will take years.
Is Union's rise sustainable?
Not at the CL level. Union's financial base supports mid-table Bundesliga — not European competition. The club needs to recalibrate expectations and costs.