What is the financial situation of Borussia Mönchengladbach? Borussia Mönchengladbach achieves a Financial Stability Score of 38 out of 100 (rating: red). The equity ratio stands at 25.3% (league average: 34.1%), the personnel cost ratio at 57.4%. The liabilities ratio is 55.8%. Equity stands at €48.9M.
Data as of:DFL Financials: FY 2023/24 (reporting date 30.06.2024)·Squad values: April 2026·Transfers: current·Update: DFL FY 24/25 expected May/June 2026
A big club in financial decline. Five Bundesliga titles, iconic history — but the balance sheet tells a different story. Equity eroding, personnel costs rigid, no European revenue. Gladbach are heading toward the Schalke trajectory: too big to be small, too weak to be big. The Borussia-Park is fully owned — the one asset that prevents a total crisis.
Gladbach ist der Club der Liga der am meisten an Schalke 2019 erinnert: Hohe Personalkosten aus besseren Zeiten, sinkende Erlöse, steigende Verbindlichkeiten. Der entscheidende Unterschied: Gladbach hat noch positives EK (48,9 Mio) und hat die Verkaufsphase eingeleitet. Ob das reicht, hängt davon ab, ob der sportliche Absturz gestoppt werden kann bevor das EK aufgefressen ist.
Financial data shown is based on DFL Financial Indicators 2025 (FY 2023/24, reporting date 30.06.2024). The Bundesliga overall grew by 6.7% in 2024/25 to over €5 billion in revenue. Whether Borussia Mönchengladbach benefited disproportionately will be revealed by the next DFL Financial Indicators, expected May or June 2026. The Outlook tab below contains an informed projection.
38
Fragile
Revenue 2023-24
€171.7M
Gross revenue · Einzel accounts
Personnel Cost Ratio
57.4%
League avg. 47.9%
Squad Value
€155M
BV €55M · Reserves €100M
Borussia-Park
54.042 seats
Eigentum
Equity Ratio
25.3%
League avg. 34.1%
Liabilities Ratio
55.8%
League avg. 47.0%
Summary: A big club in financial decline. Five Bundesliga titles, iconic history — but the balance sheet tells a different story. Equity eroding, personnel costs rigid, no European revenue. Gladbach are heading toward the Schalke trajectory: too big to be small, too weak to be big. The Borussia-Park is fully owned — the one asset that prevents a total crisis.
DFL License Check
Equity still positive but declining. If the current trajectory continues, Gladbach could face negative equity within 2-3 seasons. The club operates in the danger zone of DFL compliance — not breaching yet, but trending in the wrong direction.
Positive Equity
\u2713
€48.9M
Passed
Equity Ratio > 30%
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25.3%
-4.7pp below threshold
Liabilities < 50%
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55.8%
-5.8pp above limit
Balance Sheet (2024-12-31)
Total Assets€193.4M
Equity€48.9M
Liabilities€107.9M
P&L (2023-24)
Revenue€171.7M
Personnel Costs€98.5M
EBITDA€28.3M
Net Income€-2.4M
Equity X-Ray — Hidden Reserves
Moderate squad values with declining market prices. Several players with book values exceeding market values — a repricing risk that hasn't been recognized in the balance sheet. The squad lacks a breakout talent that could generate a windfall sale.
Scouting struggles — no consistent value creation pipeline
Risk Profile
Leading Indicators
PK-Quote-Entwicklung
57,4% ist untragbar. Auslaufende Verträge müssen genutzt werden, um die Quote auf unter 50% zu drücken.
Verbindlichkeiten über 50%
55,8% ist über der DFL-Komfortschwelle. Jeder Verlust verschlechtert die Kennzahl weiter.
Structural Risks
Hoch
CL-Kater
Gehälter aus der CL-Ära (2020-21) binden Mittel. Sportlicher Abstieg hat Erlöse gesenkt, aber die Kosten nicht proportional.
Mittel
Stadion-Finanzierung
Borussia-Park (2004) generiert Fixkosten unabhängig vom sportlichen Erfolg.
Black Swan
Abstieg in die 2. Bundesliga
Bei VQ 55,8% und PK 57,4% wäre ein Abstieg bilanziell verheerend. Erlöse halbieren sich, Fixkosten bleiben. Schalke-Parallele: Gladbach hat ein ähnliches Profil wie Schalke 2019-20 (hohe PK, hohe Verbindlichkeiten, sportlicher Abwärtstrend).
Keine adäquaten Verkäufe möglich
Wenn der Kader weiter an Marktwert verliert (von 250M auf 155M), fehlen die Transfer-Einnahmen zur Bilanz-Sanierung. Teufelskreis: schlechtere Spieler → weniger Erlöse → weniger Spielraum.
Outlook — FY 2024/25 Projection
Estimate · No official figures
Official DFL financial data covers FY 2023/24. Based on known parameters — transfer activity 2024/25, league growth (+6.7% per DFL Economic Report), sporting results — an informed projection for 30.06.2025 can be constructed. This estimate will be replaced once the official DFL financial data is published, expected May/June 2026.
Metric
FY 23/24 (DFL)
FY 24/25 (Estimate)
Revenue
€171.7M
~€183M
Personnel Costs
€98.5M
~€104M
Personnel Cost Ratio
57.4%
~56.8%
Estimated Result
€-2.4M
~€-3–-2M
Estimated Equity
€48.9M
~€46–47M
Estimated Equity Ratio
25.3%
~23–23%
Simulator (coming soon): Scenario Simulator (coming soon): From summer 2026, you can run scenarios here — What happens upon relegation? What does Europa League qualification bring? Revenue, costs, required actions — interactive per club.
Frequently Asked Questions
Is Gladbach heading toward a Schalke situation?
The trajectory is similar: declining equity, rigid costs, no European revenue. The key difference is stadium ownership — Gladbach own Borussia-Park, Schalke's Veltins-Arena financing was a burden. But the warning signs are clear.
What does Gladbach need to stabilize?
Either: return to European competition (revenue boost) or radical cost reduction (painful but necessary). The middle path — mid-table Bundesliga without Europe — is financially unsustainable for a club with Gladbach's cost structure.
Does Gladbach meet DFL requirements?
Currently yes, but the buffer is shrinking. If equity continues to decline at the current rate, the 30% equity ratio threshold could be breached within 2-3 seasons.
Why is stadium ownership so important for Gladbach?
It provides a financial floor. Even in a worst case (relegation + financial crisis), the stadium generates income and can be leveraged. Clubs without stadium ownership (Hertha, Frankfurt) don't have this safety net.