e.V. / AG · 1. Bundesliga · Est. 1899 · Deutsche Bank Park (51.500) · Frankfurt am Main
What is the financial situation of Eintracht Frankfurt? Eintracht Frankfurt achieves a Financial Stability Score of 60 out of 100 (rating: yellow). The equity ratio stands at 21.1% (league average: 34.1%), the personnel cost ratio at 37.4%. The liabilities ratio is 60.8%. Equity stands at €51.7M.
Data as of:DFL Financials: FY 2023/24 (reporting date 30.06.2024)·Squad values: April 2026·Transfers: current·Update: DFL FY 24/25 expected May/June 2026
Frankfurt are the scouting club of the Bundesliga: buy cheap, develop, sell high. The Jovic, Haller, Kostic model generates transfer profits that compensate for a modest revenue base. Europa League winners 2022 — proof that the model can deliver peak sporting success. The risk: the scouting hits must keep coming, and the Deutsche Bank Park is rented, not owned.
Frankfurt ist das Gegenmodell zu Leverkusen/Wolfsburg: Kein Konzern-Backing, sondern reines Scouting-Geschäftsmodell auf dünnem EK-Polster. Funktioniert brillant wenn die Transfers treffen (Marmoush), wird schnell existenziell wenn sie nicht treffen. Die niedrige PK-Quote gibt Spielraum — das dünne EK gibt keinen.
Financial data shown is based on DFL Financial Indicators 2025 (FY 2023/24, reporting date 30.06.2024). The Bundesliga overall grew by 6.7% in 2024/25 to over €5 billion in revenue. Whether Eintracht Frankfurt benefited disproportionately will be revealed by the next DFL Financial Indicators, expected May or June 2026. The Outlook tab below contains an informed projection.
60
Robust
Revenue 2023-24
€378.3M
Gross revenue · Konzern accounts
Personnel Cost Ratio
37.4%
League avg. 47.9%
Squad Value
€409M
BV €140M · Reserves €269M
Deutsche Bank Park
51.500 seats
Stadt (Miete)
Equity Ratio
21.1%
League avg. 34.1%
Liabilities Ratio
60.8%
League avg. 47.0%
Summary: Frankfurt are the scouting club of the Bundesliga: buy cheap, develop, sell high. The Jovic, Haller, Kostic model generates transfer profits that compensate for a modest revenue base. Europa League winners 2022 — proof that the model can deliver peak sporting success. The risk: the scouting hits must keep coming, and the Deutsche Bank Park is rented, not owned.
DFL License Check
Equity positive, but equity ratio below league average. Deutsche Bank Park is city-owned — Frankfurt pays rent, which creates a structural cost burden that clubs with owned stadiums don't have.
Positive Equity
\u2713
€51.7M
Passed
Equity Ratio > 30%
\u2717
21.1%
-8.9pp below threshold
Liabilities < 50%
\u2713
60.8%
-10.8pp buffer
Balance Sheet (2024-06-30)
Total Assets€245M
Equity€51.7M
Liabilities€148.9M
P&L (2023-24)
Revenue€378.3M
Personnel Costs€141.4M
EBITDA€66M
Net Income€27.5M
Equity X-Ray — Hidden Reserves
Moderate book values. Frankfurt's strength is buying players with low book values and developing them to high market values. The scouting model by Ben Manga consistently creates hidden reserves. Risk when expensive buys underperform (Kolo Muani before PSG sale).
Squad Valuation
Player Assets (Book Value)€140M
Squad Market Value€409M
Hidden Reserves€269M
Key Players (largest hidden reserves)
Hugo Larsson BV €8M → MV €38M+€30M
Omar Marmoush BV €0M → MV €0M+€0M
Mario Götze BV €0M → MV €5M+€0M
Transfer Balance (5 Years)
Season
Spending
Income
Net
2025-26
€68M
€95M
+€27M
2024-25
€75M
€40M
-€35M
2023-24
€50M
€60M
+€10M
2022-23
€55M
€75M
+€20M
2021-22
€35M
€50M
+€15M
5-Year Balance
€283M
€320M
+€37M
Financial Stability Score — Components
Equity Ratio (25%)
25
Personnel Costs (25%)
95
Liabilities (20%)
40
Transfer Balance (15%)
80
Revenue Diversif. (15%)
65
Strengths
Elite scouting system (Manga model) — consistent value creation
Europa League winners 2022 — proven European pedigree
Strong fan base and matchday atmosphere
Diversified transfer income — not dependent on single mega-sales
Weaknesses
Deutsche Bank Park rented from the city — ongoing cost burden
Equity ratio below league average
Scouting model requires continuous hits
No guaranteed CL revenue — dependent on sporting performance
Risk Profile
Leading Indicators
Scouting-Pipeline
Krösche/SGE-Scouting liefert konstant: Marmoush (0→75M), Kostic, N'Dicka, Ekitike. Frage ist ob der Post-Marmoush-Kader die nächste Welle bringt.
EK-Entwicklung
EK-Quote 13,7% ist strukturell niedrig. Jeder Verlust frisst überproportional am EK. Ein schlechtes Jahr könnte die Quote unter 10% drücken.
Structural Risks
Hoch
Dünnes EK-Polster
51,7 Mio EK bei 378 Mio Umsatz. Ein Verlustjahr von 20 Mio senkt die EK-Quote auf unter 10%. Kein Puffer für Fehlinvestitionen.
Mittel
Transfer-Hit-Abhängigkeit
Modell braucht regelmäßig einen Marmoush/Kostic-artigen Hit. Wenn 2-3 Transfers floppen, kippt die Bilanz schnell.
Black Swan
Zwei Transfer-Flops + verpasste Europa
Frankfurt investiert 50-70M in Spieler die sich nicht entwickeln, verpasst gleichzeitig europäischen Wettbewerb. Verlust von 30-40M bei 51,7M EK = EK-Quote unter 5%. DFL-Lizenzgefährdung.
PL Transfer-Deflation (wie BVB)
Frankfurt verkauft wie BVB primär an PL-Clubs. Private-Credit-Bust + SCR drücken Ablösen. Marmoush hätte vor 2 Jahren vielleicht nur 50M statt 75M gebracht.
Outlook — FY 2024/25 Projection
Estimate · No official figures
Official DFL financial data covers FY 2023/24. Based on known parameters — transfer activity 2024/25, league growth (+6.7% per DFL Economic Report), sporting results — an informed projection for 30.06.2025 can be constructed. This estimate will be replaced once the official DFL financial data is published, expected May/June 2026.
Metric
FY 23/24 (DFL)
FY 24/25 (Estimate)
Revenue
€378.3M
~€404M
Personnel Costs
€141.4M
~€150M
Personnel Cost Ratio
37.4%
~37.1%
Estimated Result
€27.5M
~€19–29M
Estimated Equity
€51.7M
~€71–81M
Estimated Equity Ratio
21.1%
~28–32%
Simulator (coming soon): Scenario Simulator (coming soon): From summer 2026, you can run scenarios here — What happens upon relegation? What does Europa League qualification bring? Revenue, costs, required actions — interactive per club.
Frequently Asked Questions
How does Frankfurt's financial model work?
Buy cheap, develop, sell high. The scouting team around Ben Manga identifies undervalued talent, develops them for 1-2 seasons, then sells at premium prices (Jovic 60M, Haller, Kostic). Transfer profits compensate for a modest revenue base.
Why is the Deutsche Bank Park a financial disadvantage?
It's city-owned — Frankfurt pays rent. Clubs like Bayern, BVB, or Freiburg own their stadiums and keep all revenue. Frankfurt's rent is a permanent cost line that reduces profitability.
Does Frankfurt meet DFL requirements?
Yes, but without the comfortable buffer of clubs like Freiburg or Bayern. The equity ratio is below the league average, though positive.
Is the scouting model sustainable?
It has worked for over a decade. The risk is a string of unsuccessful signings — one bad window can wipe out a year's transfer profit. The model also depends on PL clubs continuing to pay premium prices for Bundesliga talent.